

SUBJECT : Composition of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

This is a distinction  
w/o a distinction  
+ fundamental  
in the 470's.

The "National Intelligence Authority"  
GIA-RDP61S00750A0007000700835  
President of the Secretary of State, War  
and Navy and the President's personal  
representative.

Ind. 0 NSCID-1 states that the IAC is established "to  
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maintain the relationships essential to coordination between  
the CIA and the intelligence organizations" (emphasis supplied).

*preferred*  
~~not with adamant resistance from the intelligence chiefs who insisted~~  
that such a Group ~~would have to be~~ constituted by the National Security  
Council. This was agreed to and the Intelligence Advisory Committee  
was established by NSCID #1 <sup>12 December 1947,</sup> to advise the Director of Central  
Intelligence.

3. No indication has been found in the records that any consid-  
eration was given at that time or later to the thought that one  
representative from the Department of Defense might represent all  
the military entities involved. In part the military representation  
on the Intelligence Advisory Committee was a practical recognition  
of the need for close coordination with each service intelligence  
group and for close mutual support. However, it also arose in part  
out of the second proviso of Section 102(4)(3) of the National  
Security Act, which read that the departments and other agencies  
of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate,  
and disseminate departmental intelligence. This was a clear-cut  
expression of congressional intent that the integrity of the  
departmental intelligence agencies should be preserved recognized.

4. If now the Secretary of Defense wishes to unify the  
departmental intelligence agencies or at least their representation  
on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the above proviso would  
raise a question as to whether he were violating the intent of the  
Congress. Any objection based on this proviso would be purely  
technical and would not withstand a determination made in the  
interest of intradepartmental efficiency. A more difficult question

*I doubt  
the  
proviso  
means  
to include  
more  
than*

*Backwards. Rather: H. See how wishes to unify IAC representation,  
without unifying the departmental intelligence  
agencies, he is off-base. He NSCID-1  
However, if there becomes one mil. intel dept., then, IAC rep. is logical.*

is presented if the Central Intelligence Agency were to adopt the position that unified representation would be detrimental to the functioning of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and to the coordination of intelligence activities relating to the national security.

5. Under sections 102(d)(1) and 102(d)(2) of the National Security Act, this Agency has a duty to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning the intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies and to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities. If, therefore, the Agency believed that possible action <sup>to unify mil. intel agencies</sup> by the Secretary of Defense would be detrimental it would have a duty to advise the National Security Council and recommend against such unification. Even if the Agency believed that the unified <sup>mil. intel agencies were desirable</sup> ~~representation would be beneficial~~, it would be necessary to recommend to the National Security Council an appropriate amendment to NSCID #1 <sup>to provide for unified representation of these unified agencies</sup>

6. If the service representatives on the Intelligence Advisory Committee are replaced by a single representative from the Department of Defense or in the alternative if the Department of Defense representative is added to the service representation, there would be no change, in our opinion, in the responsibilities and authorities ~~for~~ the Director of Central Intelligence or in his <sup>legal</sup> relation to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. There is no question in our mind that Congress holds the Director alone responsible for results

in the field of intelligence related to the national security. Neither he nor the National Security Council can spread this responsibility or establish <sup>ive</sup> collective responsibility in any group or committee. It was for this reason that the Intelligence Advisory Committee was properly set up to advise the Director. This limitation on the Committee's power has not been universally accepted and repeated attempts have been made to establish that the Director is merely one among equals in any matter coming before the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Whenever the issue has been clearly joined on this point, however, pre-eminence of the Director has been specifically recognized. The word "pre-eminence" is carefully chosen as the relation of the Director to the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; it is in no sense a command relation. The normal role of authority consistent with responsibility cannot be applied here in simple form. One Director believed clarification necessary to the point of obtaining authority from the National Intelligence Authority to have him act as their Executive Agent in all matters relating to intelligence. He never exercised this authority, and his successor deemed it advisable to establish the relation more nearly in its present form. However, the Director has a right <sup>recognized in USCIB-1</sup> to <sup>para 3,</sup> request more than simple cooperation, although this is the basis of successful functioning, and in the final analysis to place ~~the~~ <sup>any</sup> issue before the National Security Council even in face of the unanimous opposition of the entire Intelligence Advisory Committee whether constituted in its present form or with the unified representation of the Department of Defense.